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In this paper we describe results from an exploratory study observing infusion pump use in 
practice. From 31 observations of pump programming we note 10 low-level disturbances, which we 
conceptualise in terms of unremarkable error. This data supports a view that well performing 
systems cope with error as part of their normal work. Users are able to recover from error and are 
resilient to performance deviations. However, it is not clear how we, as HCI researchers, should 
respond to these minor errors: should we aim to minimise them or instead aim to improve 
detection, recovery and control in safety-critical systems? What is clear is that without remarking 
on unremarkable error we cannot begin this dialogue and consider the handling of these issues. To 
conclude we recognise four important factors that influence remedial action, and we highlight the 
need for a socio-technical approach for making change that is appropriate for practice. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, in HCI, we have focused on things 
that go wrong. Whilst more recently, there has 
been a shift towards user experience and novel 
interactive experiences, some things are still going 
wrong. Whereas this can be frustrating in ticket 
machines and websites, it is safety-critical in 
healthcare. However, things very often also go right 
despite errors and design vulnerabilities, in ways 
that are typically unnoticed. People find ingenious 
ways to cope with challenging circumstances and 
poor design. Systems are said to be resilient where 
performance is maintained despite the existence of 
deficiencies and errors (Hollnagel, 2004). 
 
In this paper, we report on a study in a hospital Day 
Care Unit, where we focused our attention on how 
nurses interact with infusion devices while treating 
patients. In practice, nurses make minor errors 
(deviations from the “golden path”) in number entry 
and in device use, but they catch and correct these 
errors, making the system resilient. It is tempting to 
argue that devices should be designed to eliminate 
all such errors. In practice, though, this would be 
extremely costly, and probably infeasible. So the 
question then becomes: which are acceptable, 
which are not, and how is design and research 
effort best directed to prevent errors from 
escalating and to keep the system working 
efficiently. Exploring the resilience in unremarkable 
interactions and errors may help us to achieve this. 
We propose to start a dialogue around these issues 
to make informed decisions about how to handle 
them. 
2. BACKGROUND 
Reporting and learning systems are in place to 
learn from accidents and SUIs (serious untoward 
incidents) in the NHS. These systems keep a 
record of remarkable events. However, studying 
normal work before things go wrong receives less 
attention. We utilise the concept of ‘unremarkable’ 
to look at normal work (Tolmie et al., 2002). This 
helps capture the routines and meanings that are 
not remarked upon, which would otherwise go 
unnoticed. 
2.1 Studies in healthcare 
To Err is Human (Kohn et al., 2000) is a widely 
cited report which highlights the need for improved 
understanding and intervention to reduce the 
occurrence of preventable harm in healthcare. 
They make the assertion that at least 44,000 
Americans die each year from medical errors – 
which is more than deaths separately attributable to 
motor-vehicle accidents, breast cancer, and AIDS. 
Preventing avoidable medical errors is a worldwide 
issue. For example, figures from the National 
Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) suggest that more 
than 5,700 patients in England died or suffered 
serious harm due to errors for the 6 months 
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between October 2008 and March 2009. We 
believe that some of these errors can be prevented 
and reduced through the better design and use of 
medical devices.  
 
One adverse incident which has a detailed inquiry 
report which is publicly available concerns the 
death of Wayne Jowett, in 2001, who received an 
intravenous medication intrathecally (Toft, 2001); 
i.e. a medication that was meant to be delivered 
into a vein was delivered into his spinal cord. The 
report demonstrates how the design of medical 
equipment and different people in different roles 
with different assumptions and procedures can 
contribute to a SUI. Independently these variations 
in normal performance may be absorbed by the 
system but here they conspired to cause this 
accident. Using a similar systemic perspective as 
demonstrated by Toft (2001) we wish to examine 
the strengths and vulnerabilities in system design 
that affect the likelihood of error. However, we look 
specifically around the design and use of medical 
devices, and we are looking at 'normal' work and 
not investigating a particular adverse incident. 
 
Previous HCI-related studies show that medical 
devices suffer from design problems (Obradovich & 
Woods, 1996), that many errors can be observed in 
infusion device set-up but very few are reported 
(Husch et al., 2005), that staff have difficulty with 
new equipment and can have little support in using 
the device from the manufacturer (Randell, 2004a), 
and that staff and patients react very differently to 
alarms when devices sound (Randell, 2004b). 
Collectively these studies show important HCI 
issues around the design and use of medical 
devices that need investigating. We plan to build on 
this work and investigate infusion pump design and 
use on a Haematology and Oncology Day Unit. 
2.2 Unremarkable interaction and error 
Unremarkable computing was introduced as a 
concept to orientate the design of ubiquitous 
computing in domestic life (Tolmie et al., 2002). 
Here, the emphasis is on trying to design systems 
that fit routine actions and support the semantics in 
context, rather than introducing unfamiliar 
technology and unnatural semantics, which disturb 
the context. To achieve this, special attention must 
be paid to the invisible: i.e. the actions and 
meanings that go unnoticed but contribute to the 
successful routine of everyday life.  
 
These sorts of expert, habitual, unspoken routines 
can also be seen in the Haematology and 
Oncology Day Unit. These routines contribute to 
the coordination of activities between staff, and 
between staff and patients. One example involves 
the preparation of the trolley that is loaded with the 
patient’s medication and equipment needed to 
administer the treatment before the nurse 
approaches the patient. For the nurses involved, 
the movement and preparation of the trolley was 
found to signify a unit of work, and until it is cleared 
and tidied the unit of work is incomplete. This was 
highlighted when a new member of staff had left a 
trolley untidy after they had finished with a patient. 
A regular member of staff explained the routine and 
expected them to follow this practice. From this 
perspective an unorganised trolley represents an 
unorganised environment and unfinished work. 
 
One of the key features of unremarkable 
phenomena is that they are regarded as normal 
and so people do not feel the need to remark on 
them. We think this not only applies to normal 
routines but also to low-level interaction error; e.g. 
number entry errors which are quickly modified to 
represent the correct value. Baker (1997) reports 
that whilst very few nurses have problems with 
reporting ‘real errors’ they would not report 
deviations from the formal institutional rules if 
according to their own rules these are not 
considered remarkable errors. These include: 
• If it’s not my fault it is not an error; e.g. if a 
patient is not in the part of the ward where 
they were due to receive their treatment the 
nurse cannot perform their duties. 
• If everyone knows, it is not an error, e.g. an 
experienced nurse explained that drugs that 
should be administered at 0800 hours are 
administered at 0600 hours to fit the wards 
routine. 
• If you can put it right it’s not an error, e.g. a 
drug that is given frequently late in a cycle 
might just be given earlier to get it back on 
track. 
• If a patient has needs that are more urgent 
than the accurate administration of 
medication it is not an error, e.g. a patient 
might be given some drugs earlier and 
some later to give them undisturbed time to 
rest and sleep. 
• A clerical error is not a medication error, 
e.g. a nurse that correctly administered 
treatment but records the wrong time is only 
guilty of a clerical error. 
• If an irregularity is carried out to prevent 
something worse, it is not an error, e.g. 
patients being discharged early to allow 
space for newer more urgent cases. 
 
The nurses that validated this informal set of rules 
were described as being “shocked by having to 
hear them spoken aloud,” whilst some, “looked 
over their shoulders to see if anyone else could 
hear before they agreed that these are indeed the 
rules” (Baker, 1997). Given this response, it is not 
surprising that the nurses did not report interaction 
issues with their pumps, and that an observational 
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approach is needed to investigate unremarkable 
interaction and errors. More broadly, it seems a 
tension exists between a traditional classification of 
error and actions taken to make the system work. 
3. METHOD 
This study focuses on a Haematology and 
Oncology Day Care Unit in a busy London hospital. 
The unit provides treatment to patients on a day 
basis, i.e. typically patients will come in, get 
treatment and return home on the same day. This 
includes the use of infusion pumps for intravenous 
treatment; e.g. chemotherapy treatment. Given the 
high frequency of infusion pumps being used, these 
were the focus of the study. 
 
Volumetric infusion pumps are important and 
ubiquitous medical devices in hospitals. These 
devices control the rate of flow of fluid from a bag 
to a patient. The bag will normally contain some 
form of medication or nutrient in fluid form. The 
volumetric pumps can be programmed specifying a 
VTBI (volume to be infused), an infusion rate and a 
time for the infusion. These devices will have some 
sort of number entry system and a display so one 
can see menus, messages and numbers being 
entered. 
 
We took an observational approach to study the 
normal use of infusion pumps in context. These 
research activities were performed over five study 
days: 
• Work shadowing. The researcher 
shadowed members of the clinical team as 
they performed their duties with devices, 
e.g. setting up infusion pumps, making 
checks on devices, and seeing what 
happens when infusions were complete. 
• Day Care Unit observation. The researcher 
observed working practices on the Day 
Care Unit to understand what was going on 
from day to day in the patient and staff 
areas. 
• Semi-structured interviews. We planned to 
interview five members of clinical staff at 
different grades (e.g. Band 5 nurse to 
Matron) but only two could be arranged 
because of how busy the nurses were. 
These two interviews were audio recorded 
and transcribed. Other members of staff 
were spoken to whilst being observed, and 
notes were kept of these interactions. 
4. RESULTS  
To contextualise low-level error, we describe the 
normal programming of an infusion pump before 
detailing ten disturbances that were observed. This 
normal programming path and its deviations are 
captured in Figure 1. 
4.1 Normal infusion pump interaction 
Figure 1 details a task analysis of infusion pump 
preparation and interaction, i.e. putting the right 
physical elements in place for the treatment and 
then programming the infusion pump. 
 
In the preparation phase the nurse first needs to 
establish an access point in the patient. In most 
cases this will involve a cannula to create an 
intravenous access point in the arm of the patient. 
The medicine for the patient is then collected and 
another nurse will check that the right medicine has 
been collected. The nurse will then check the 
patient’s name and date of birth before the 
treatment is administered. Once these checks are 
complete, the nurse will hang the bag containing 
the treatment on a stand and retrieve a ‘giving set’. 
This is the tubing that connects the bag and the 
patient, which contains a mechanism to be inserted 
into the pump so it can control and monitor the flow 
of the fluid. The bag is spiked, which connects the 
giving set and the bag, and the treatment is allowed 
to flow through the set until it reaches the end of 
the tubing so no air is in the line. That end is then 
attached to the patient and the nurse checks for air 
bubbles. At this stage, the fluid cannot flow 
because the roller clamp prevents it. 
 
In the interaction stage the nurse turns on the 
pump and presses the eject button to open its door. 
The giving set is inserted and the door is closed. 
The nurse then presses the OK button to get to the 
VTBI (volume to be infused) input screen. They 
input the correct value and confirm it by pressing 
OK. The nurse then either enters the infusion rate 
or the time, confirms this by pressing OK, and then 
the pump automatically calculates the third missing 
value, i.e. the infusion rate or the time for the 
infusion. The nurse will release the roller clamp that 
allows the fluid to flow. Once the nurse is confident 
that the pump has the correct values they press 
START, which starts the infusion, and they tell the 
patient how long the infusion will take. 
Programming the pump in this interaction stage 
would typically last between 5 and 15 seconds. 
4.2 Infusion pump error and disturbances 
Generally, the devices were used without issue and 
with little effort. They seemed well designed and 
the nurses were happy with them. However, from 
31 observations of infusion pump programming 10 
disturbances or deviations from the ‘golden path’ 
were observed. These are interesting because they 
provide opportunity for learning. We know from the 
literature and experience that error and 
disturbances happen frequently (Reason, 2008). 
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Also, we know that people are very good at 
avoiding these errors, noticing them, and 
recovering from them (Hollnagel, 2004). ‘Resilience 
strategies’ is a concept used to capture these sorts 
of behaviours (Furniss et al., 2011). 
 
The following numbers correspond to the 
disturbances in Figure 1: 
Disturbance 1. The access point 
The infusion pump alarms when there is an 
occlusion in the line, which prevents the flow of 
fluid, and this can happen if the patient moves. This 
will mean that the nurse has to go over, check the 
occlusion, and continue the infusion. There was an 
incident where a nurse had to frequently go back to 
a patient because this was happening more than 
normal. The nurse said that she could not make a 
better insertion point because the patient’s veins 
did not allow her to do so. Whilst the chemotherapy 
nurses are skilled in establishing intravenous 
access, the frequent use and subsequently poor 
state of the veins of some patients may require 
them to use access points which are prone to 
occlusion with the potential for more alarms and the 
need for more nurse attention. 
Disturbance 2: Checking with another nurse. 
Safety procedures on the Unit require nurses to 
check that they have the right medicine with 
another nurse. This involves them signing the 
prescription so it is on record. The first author 
(hereafter referred to as A1) observed one nurse 
going through the details of the prescription with 
the patient, after she had done the checks with a 
colleague. It was only then she realised that she 
did not have the magnesium she was meant to 
have. It was an interesting case because the 
patient could speak little English and it was unlikely 
she understood the nurse. However, this 
explanation served to bring the oversight to the 
nurse’s attention. The nurse reiterated how 
important it is to check. 
Disturbance 3. Priming line with no bubbles 
Intravenous therapy requires that the line delivering 
the treatment is free from air bubbles. The infusion 
pump also has the ability to detect these. However, 
the nurses reported that the hospital had recently 
received a batch of sets that tripped the alarm 
when there was not really a problem, i.e. it gave a 
false alarm. The nurses were advised to lubricate 
part of the set with alcohol gel as a workaround. A1 
observed a case where the gel was not applied and 
the alarm went off. 
Disturbance 4. Roller clamp control 
The infusion device asks the nurse to release the 
Figure 1: Task steps in infusion pump preparation and interaction. Disturbances are denoted by lightning bolts. 
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roller clamp after the set has been inserted and the 
door has been closed. At this stage the nurse 
should release the roller clamp and press OK to 
confirm. However, many nurses do not release it at 
this stage and it does not appear to matter, just as 
long as it is done before START is pressed. A1 
observed a nurse who pressed START before 
releasing the roller clamp. The alarm sounded and 
the nurse recalled they had not released it. In this 
case the nurse appeared to need to calculate the 
VTBI rather than it being on the prescription (similar 
to disturbance 5 below). We speculate that this 
extra cognitive load may have contributed to the 
nurse forgetting the roller clamp. 
 
Another nurse A1 observed waited to see if you 
had to press OK after closing the pump’s door, or 
whether the device would skip this screen after a 
time delay. This nurse was interested in this and 
thought A1 would be too given the study’s aims so 
she was willing to carry out this experiment in her 
work. This demonstrated that the nurse did not 
understand the request to release the roller clamp 
upon closing the pump’s door. The nurse seemed 
to just understand that OK needed to be pressed to 
reach the VTBI input screen.  
 
Through discussing error with the roller clamp, a 
nurse explained that he was aware of instances 
where the roller clamp had been left up in gravity 
infusions. In gravity infusions pumps are not 
needed and so there is no alarm to warn the nurse 
the clamp has not been released. In these 
instances the patient thinks they are receiving 
treatment when actually nothing is happening. At 
one level this is merely a frustrating delay, but at 
another this can extend an already long visit for 
seriously ill patients, so it is non-trivial. 
Disturbance 5. Enter VTBI value 
A1 observed a nurse who seemed to be interacting 
with the infusion pump more than normal. It turned 
out that the prescription she was given did not 
include the VTBI but only had the infusion rate and 
the time, i.e. 15ml/hr over 20min. She could not 
skip the VTBI step to enter the time and the rate 
directly, and the calculation was not working for her 
at the time. She guessed at a VTBI, then entered 
the rate or time to get a feel of what the actual 
figure was. The nurse then appeared to restart the 
machine and enter in the correct VTBI. This was 
unusual because in the majority of cases the VTBI 
is given on the prescription.  
Disturbance 6. Battery charge 
After pressing START the nurse immediately 
stopped the infusion and pointed to the battery 
indicator of the machine, which showed it was low. 
This patient had been receiving treatment all day 
and the battery would not last for the last two hour 
infusion he had left. The nurse looked for a plug 
socket but did not appear to be able to find a 
convenient one. She got another machine and 
reprogrammed it. She explained that the machine 
alarms if its batteries are running low and it is 
annoying having to change pumps part way 
through an infusion. This is because the new pump 
would need to be programmed with unfamiliar and 
partial VTBI and time values so calculations and 
checks would be more difficult. It was also noted 
that it is better not to have the infusion pumps 
plugged in because patients sometimes move 
around, e.g. to go to the toilet. 
Disturbance 7. Tell patient length of treatment 
The ‘normal’ case appears to be to inform the 
patient how long the infusion treatment will take; 
however, this step was not always observed. 
Sometimes the nurse would also explain about the 
pump alarms and not to worry when they sounded 
e.g. if the pumps are within ten minutes of finishing 
a program their alarm will sound to alert the nurse.  
 
Further disturbances to do with number input entry 
which are not indicated on Figure 1 include: 
Disturbance 8. Within keying sequence 
There was a nurse that intended to enter 1010ml 
for the VTBI. A minor error in their keying sequence 
meant that they first entered 100ml, then 1100ml, 
then 1000ml, then 1010ml. This was all done in a 
fast fluid motion and at no point did the nurse not 
appear in control.  We are confident that this is no 
more than a very minor keying error. 
Disturbance 9. Within menu keying issue 
There was a nurse that entered 400ml for the VTBI 
but then paused rather than pressing OK. They 
rechecked the script and then changed the VTBI to 
200ml and entered the time of 30min. We can 
speculate that the nurse had already calculated the 
infusion rate in their head and mistakenly entered 
this as the VTBI. 
Disturbance 10. Between menu keying issue 
There was a nurse that programmed the pump to 
give 250ml over 1hr. On pressing OK to confirm the 
time they checked the infusion bag, and then 
changed the time to 2hrs, pressed START and 
continued. Again, A1 did not sense that the nurse 
was not in control. 
5. DISCUSSION 
These observations raise interesting issues and 
questions. The first is that the system worked well, 
both in terms of safety and efficiency, and the 
nurses’ own self-reports suggests that they do not 
have a problem with the device design or use. We 
highlight this because the content of this report 
might emphasise poor performance when this is 
not the case. We address other interesting areas 
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that precipitate out of the unremarkable errors we 
observed in this context; including its resilient 
qualities, factors that influence the response to 
these low-level disturbances, and the need to 
consider system-wide socio-technical interventions. 
5.1 Resilience and Recoveries 
From the disturbances above we see that 
recoveries happened frequently. We have noted 10 
types of disturbance in 31 observations. However, 
all errors were recovered from, suggesting 
resilience in the system. Recoveries appear to be 
either self-administered or prompted by some 
external source, e.g. an alarm or another person 
(see disturbances 4 and 6 above). We can identify 
different levels of recovery dependent on its 
position relative to confirmation checks: 
• Within menu recovery. This sort of recovery 
was observed as the nurse entered some 
value or after they had entered a value but 
before they had pressed OK to confirm that 
value (see disturbances 8 and 9 above). 
• Between menu recovery. This sort of 
recovery was observed after the nurse had 
confirmed a value by pressing OK. The 
nurse would then go back into that 
interaction to change the value (see 
disturbance 10 above). 
• After START recovery. This is where the 
nurse has committed to start the infusion 
but then encounters something that needs 
changing (see disturbances 4 and 6). 
• After safety check recovery. This sort of 
recovery was observed to happen after 
some safety check had been confirmed 
(see disturbance 2 above). 
 
It seems clear that there is resilience in the system 
because it copes without incident despite there 
being relatively frequent performance deviations 
(Hollnagel, 2004). 
5.2 How should we respond to these low-level 
disturbances? 
There seem to be two broad ways of viewing minor 
errors:  
(i) errors need to be fixed as they represent 
deviations in performance and potential 
threats to safety; the frequency of error is a 
sign of the health of a system; systems can 
be error-free if procedures and practices 
are adhered to;  
(ii) errors are an inevitable part of every day 
activities, so it is not their overall reduction 
that we should aim for, but maximizing the 
avoidance, detection, control and recovery 
from errors when they occur.  
Behind these approaches are very different 
perspectives on error. The former sees error as 
part of a world of accidents and near misses and 
aims for error-free everyday practice. The latter 
accepts error as part of everyday practice, and 
recognizes accidents as unfortunate events that 
occur when performance deviations coincide and 
errors remain unchecked, so focuses more on 
avoiding escalation and enhancing control than on 
avoiding occurrence per se (Hollnagel, 2004). 
Since the role of unremarkable errors is unclear, it 
is important to report unremarkable error to inform 
our understanding of the system. Errors are 
ubiquitous in normal work. However, what to do in 
response to these low-level errors is a non-trivial 
matter. We highlight four interdependent factors 
that influence the prospect of remedial action: 
5.2.1. Significant issues versus irritations 
At the risk of making an obvious point, one of the 
driving factors that determine what remedial action 
is taken is the issue’s significance. If the highlighted 
issue poses significant risk then there is more onus 
on management to fix the issue than if it is a minor 
irritation. It therefore seems obvious to act on 
highly significant issues, and it could be considered 
a waste of resources to act on issues of little 
significance.  
 
Unremarkable errors by their very nature are likely 
to be of low significance. However, they could 
escalate and have the potential to develop into 
something remarkable if they remain unchecked or 
are not recovered from. For example, Toft (2001) 
shows many minor performance deviations can 
conspire to cause a tragic event. Also, 
unremarkable errors might be small and frustrating 
on a local scale but if we imagine the thousands of 
nurses worldwide who might be suffering the same 
frustrations on a daily basis then this gives us 
greater cause for concern. 
5.2.2. Recognisable solution 
Another important factor that will influence the 
likelihood of remedial action is whether there is a 
recognisable solution. Many issues were observed, 
which are listed in the analysis but some have 
more apparent design interventions than others. 
Here, we focus on the three main ones that readily 
lead to a design intervention: 
 
Disturbance 1. Intravenous Access Point: 
Sometimes nurses will struggle to establish good 
intravenous access and when this happens the 
occlusion alarm might go off more frequently. This 
uses valuable nurse time and attention. For 
example, an occlusion alarm is often caused by a 
patient moving their arm; this can be quickly 
corrected by repositioning it without the nurse's 
attendance. However, once the alarm gets tripped 
a nurse has to restart the pump. Anecdotally we 
Unremarkable Errors: low-level disturbances in infusion pump use 
Dominic Furniss, Ann Blandford & Astrid Mayer 
7 
have heard of patients in other wards who 
observed nurses restarting pumps, and then 
performed these actions on the pump themselves 
to save the nurse attending. Subverting official 
procedures, patients shared this knowledge 
amongst themselves. A potential design 
intervention in this case is to have the device check 
whether the occlusion is clear shortly after the first 
alarm is triggered. We have been reliably told that 
at least one pump on the market has this feature. 
This means that the patient can reposition their arm 
to clear the occlusion, so the alarm deactivates and 
the pump continues. In this case, the nurse does 
not have to attend and patients do not find 
themselves subverting safety procedures. 
 
Disturbance 5. Enter VTBI value: It is a hindrance if 
a nurse cannot find the VTBI in their prescription 
because they are forced to input it before they can 
progress with treatment. It seems that this stage 
could be skipped to allow the nurse to enter the 
infusion rate and the time so that the pump 
calculates the VTBI itself. Other socio-technical 
interventions are discussed in Section 5.3 below. 
 
Disturbance 6. Battery charge: It seems beneficial 
that the device warns the user if they try to 
programme a treatment that will outlast the 
battery’s power. Importantly, the device should do 
this at the point of programming rather than wait 
until part way through a treatment to announce that 
it is running out of power. 
 
These design interventions are suggestions on 
what should be done to alleviate the issues raised 
and improve interaction. Previous research has 
shown that designers and developers respond 
more positively when presented with suggested 
design solutions rather than just problems 
(Hornbæk & Frøkjær, 2005; Blandford et al. 2006). 
This provides them with a resource for action that 
alludes to the potential intervention’s cost, benefit 
and what might be involved in making the change. 
 
HCI has a strong tradition of finding interactive 
issues and suggesting design implications to 
improve usability. The three examples above fit this 
model. In contrast, it is less obvious how one 
should handle some of the other unremarkable 
issues and errors. For example, disturbances 8, 9 
and 10 are key press errors with no obvious design 
intervention that would eliminate errors at this level. 
RFID technology or a bar code reader could 
eliminate number entry at this stage but these 
errors would probably just be passed to a different 
part of the system, e.g. if pharmacy entered the 
values for the RFID tags they might have the same 
issues. If we cannot suggest a way forward then it 
is unlikely that remedial action will be taken, 
because it is not clear what this would entail. 
5.2.3. Focus of interest 
Interest is also likely to play a role in the prospect 
of remedial action. Some issues might be more 
inherently interesting to the researcher, staff or 
management, meaning that they will be more likely 
to commit and expend efforts to solve the problem. 
For example, we commented that there was no 
obvious design intervention for the number entry 
errors (disturbances 8, 9 and 10); however, being 
reflexive, others with different interests to our own 
might disagree. For example, colleagues 
associated with this project more broadly are 
starting to engage with number entry error at a fine-
grained level. We speculate that they would rise to 
the challenge of reducing these low-level errors 
through benchmarking, analysis, redesign and re-
testing. It is not clear what redesigns might achieve 
these aims but they at least have the interest and 
skills to engage with the problem. Similarly, others 
might interpret the issues we have raised in 
innovative ways and see potential where we do not. 
Again, this highlights the importance of reporting 
unremarkable issues as these might lead to 
remarkable ideas in others; things which the 
original observers did not see. 
 
Our focus on unremarkable errors has developed 
from our interest in human error, HCI, and medical 
device design and use. Clinicians have overlapping 
interests that are not on HCI per se, e.g. patient 
safety and improving the provision of healthcare. In 
short, these low-level interaction errors are 
attended to through HCI interests but overlap with 
interests of other professionals, which will affect the 
potential for remedial actions in practice. 
5.2.4. Resource friendly 
Changes in design and socio-technical systems 
come with a cost. The lower the cost and the higher 
the benefit, the more likely that a change will be 
made. For changes impacting on safety in the UK 
the law says that risk should be made to be ‘as low 
as reasonably practicable’ (ALARP), which is 
policed by the Health and Safety Executive. 
 
These four interdependent factors play a part in 
how researchers and practitioners respond to 
unremarkable errors in systems. Taken at their 
extremes, we can see how they work in affecting 
the likelihood of taking remedial action: 
(i) Taking remedial action: If the issue is of 
significance, a solution is recognised, it is 
of inherent interest to stakeholders, and it is 
of low cost then it is highly likely the change 
will be made.  
(ii) Not taking remedial action: If the issue is of 
little significance, a solution is not easily 
identified, it is of little interest to 
stakeholders, and potential interventions 
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are dramatic and costly then it is highly 
unlikely a change will be made.  
Looking at extremes can often simplify how things 
work, but these extremes are infrequent in practice. 
More common and more complicated are the 
shades of grey that lie between these poles. When 
there is a mixture of interacting variables it is less 
clear which issues should be investigated and what 
remedial actions should be taken. All of these 
factors need to be considered on a case by case 
basis to determine potential remedial actions and 
the directions of further research efforts. 
5.3 Socio-technical intervention 
The performance deviations that we have observed 
in this study also raise questions with regard to how 
one should go about deciding on an appropriate 
intervention. For example, in the case of 
disturbance 6, the battery charge issue, it seems 
clear that a manufacture intervention could warn 
nurses about low battery charge at the point of 
programming. However, less clear is the response 
to disturbance 5, which is the VTBI input constraint. 
Here, the manufacturer might redesign the device 
to allow this stage to be skipped; technicians might 
reconfigure the device set up so that values can be 
entered into the pump in any order (this solves the 
problem of needing to skip the VTBI stage as this 
constraint is removed); managers might review 
policies to ensure that every prescription has an 
accurate VTBI on it; and nurses might be taught a 
workaround whereby they cannot skip the VTBI 
stage but could get the device to work out the VTBI 
by entering the time and the infusion rate. To 
investigate which response is most appropriate, a 
systems approach is required. A rich dialogue 
needs to be established between different people 
with different roles and responsibilities. Where 
socio-technical systems are complex, as in a 
hospital, our experience shows that no one person 
has a complete picture, and so investigations are 
built up through finding incomplete pieces of the 
puzzle. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Unremarkable errors deserve special consideration 
in healthcare. They can point to interaction issues 
that nurses either cannot self-report, or which they 
do not class as error. Investigating issues from 
normal work has the potential of recognising 
vulnerabilities before untoward incidents have 
occurred, and also of identifying work-arounds that 
are routinely adopted to mitigate error. Recognising 
interaction vulnerabilities that are significant, have 
a solution, hold stakeholder interest and are 
resource friendly means remedial action is likely. 
We have found that unremarkable errors that do 
not fit this model are harder to handle 
appropriately. What is clear is that unremarkable 
error should be investigated and reported to build 
up a realistic picture of error, and to start a dialogue 
to consider how to handle these practices. 
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